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Enacted in January 2017, China’s Foreign Non-Governmental Organisation 
Management Law (“FNGO Law”) has been interpreted as the clearest evi-
dence of “shrinking spaces” for civil society in China. While the overall trend 
towards tightened political control and the restriction of independent soci-
etal initiatives under Xi Jinping continues unabated, the effects of the new 
legal environment for non-profits operating in China remain ambiguous.
 • The new FNGO Law epitomises the Chinese party-state’s securitised and mis-
trustful approach towards independent social forces – notably those with West-
ern backing – in the “new era.”
 • However, as opposed to other countries with restrictive NGO laws, Chinese au-
thorities have stopped short of directly attacking or scapegoating NGOs. In-
stead, they portray the law as a transparency- and service-oriented regulatory 
improvement that finally grants foreign NGOs legal security.
 • After two years, 110 European organisations out of a total of 734 have registered 
offices or carried out “temporary activities” under the law. Finding a Chinese 
sponsor remains the foremost challenge. But even registered NGOs struggle 
with onerous reporting burdens and transaction costs.
 • In conjunction with the Charity Law, the FNGO Law represents an effort to 
gradually replace foreign funding with domestic donations. But the new legal 
environment generally favours larger foundations at the expense of smaller, 
grassroots organisations – be they Chinese or foreign ones.
Policy Implications
China’s FNGO Law is but one piece of a broader shift towards a new governance 
approach, one that strikes a fragile balance between the openness required for 
China’s lofty global ambitions and the party-state’s all-encompassing claim to 
top-down social control. Facing this challenge to liberal, pluralist conceptions 
of international relations, European engagement with China requires both co-
operation and confrontation. Non-profits engaging directly with Chinese coun-
terparts are as important as advocacy-oriented NGOs working on more sensi-
tive issues without the restrictions that come with continued access to mainland 
China.
   2    GIGA FOCUS | ASIA | NO. 6 | DECEMBER 2018 
Shrinking or Changing Spaces for Civil Society?
International non-governmental organisations (INGOs) have played a consider-
able role in supporting China’s development, and in strengthening ties between 
it and Western countries in recent decades. Starting from semi-official exchange 
programmes between US, German, and British foundations and China’s “mass or-
ganisations” in the 1980s, INGO activities later expanded and diversified to include 
on-the-ground support for the country’s booming grassroots NGO sector. Far from 
actively supporting systemic opposition to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 
most INGOs have in fact focused on capacity-building in the non-profit and social 
services sectors. Numerous Chinese government agencies have, equally, relied on 
international models and expertise in modernising China’s social, health or educa-
tion policies. 
Since the first decade of this century, the work environment for foreign civil 
society actors has become visibly more difficult. Chinese policy debates on NGOs 
used to be roughly divided between proponents of a “sinicised” version of (non-
confrontational, service-oriented) civil society with important input from Western 
countries and critics portraying INGOs as a potentially subversive tool of US foreign 
policy. The latter, security-oriented faction clearly gained traction in the wake of 
the “Colour Revolutions” in Central Asia – and even more so after the “Arab Spring” 
revolts. Both were blamed on Western support for grassroots civil society and op-
positional social movements. Since Xi Jinping’s ascent to paramount leadership in 
2012/2013, the rollback of previous decentralisation efforts within the state and the 
party apparatus as well as intensified crackdowns on previously tolerated advocacy 
activities (e.g. by independent unions, women’s rights groups, and human rights 
lawyers) have intensified the perception of “shrinking spaces” for civic actors in 
China. The impression that Chinese authorities have come to see foreign NGOs pri-
marily as a security threat is supported by leaked internal documents of the party, 
which define “civil society” (gongmin shehui) as a “political tool […] adopted by 
Western anti-China forces” and advocacy as “a serious form of political opposition” 
(ChinaFile 2013). Widely publicised cases such as Swedish NGO worker Peter Dahl-
in’s arrest and public parading on state television in early 2016 have contributed to 
this perception of hostility too. 
In this issue, we intend to assess the wider implications of the new institution-
al environment for foreign as well as domestic non-profit organisations in China. 
First, we outline the political background to and important formal consequences 
of new legislation on INGOs active in China. The second section shows how official 
policy communication surrounding the new FNGO law stands in marked contrast to 
its restrictive formal stipulations. Then, we ask what can be learned from the law’s 
actual implementation since early 2017, and put these developments in the larger 
context of recent changes in the legal and political environment for China’s third 
sector. In a last step, we turn to European NGOs’ varying responses and coping 
strategies in this new environment. The paper concludes with an outlook and some 
recommendations for European non-profits and decision makers.
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China’s FNGO Law: Securitising Civil Society Policy
Adopted in April 2016, and enacted in January 2017, the “Law on Administration 
of Activities of Foreign NGOs in Mainland China” (FNGO Law) has been widely 
interpreted in Europe and the US as formal evidence of “shrinking spaces” for 
civil society in China. Although more moderate pilot regulations on FNGO man-
agement had previously been launched at the provincial level already, the decisive 
push for the new national law came from the National Security Commission – one 
among a number of high-powered organs created at CCP headquarters in 2013, and 
chaired personally by President Xi. This origin in top security circles explains why 
regulatory competence for FNGOs was transferred from the Ministry of Civil Af-
fairs (MoCA), responsible for supervising the domestic third sector, to the Ministry 
of Public Security (MPS) and lower-level Public Security Bureaus (PSBs). In other 
words, FNGOs in China are now overseen by police authorities – a clear sign of the 
securitisation of China’s policy towards international civil society.
The new law leaves “foundations, social groups, think tanks and other non-
profit, nongovernmental social organizations” (Article 2) legally established outside 
mainland China two avenues for carrying out legal activities: either by seeking PSB 
approval for a registered “representative office” or by asking a Chinese partner or-
ganisation to file records for “temporary activities” of no more than one year’s dur-
ation (Arts. 9–11; 16–17). In addition to imposing onerous reporting requirements 
(Art. 12) and giving public security incisive “oversight and supervision” competences 
(Arts. 39–43), the law also subjects international NGOs to the so-called dual regis-
tration system. This means that they need to find a Chinese sponsor organisation 
that “approves” – and thereby effectively vouches for – all of their activities. This 
system had been the subject of much controversial debate since the 1990s, and is 
currently being partially abolished for domestic social organisations (Yang, Wilkin-
son, and Zhang 2016) but simultaneously maintained and tightened as a manage-
ment tool for FNGOs. The official list of potential supervisory organs, published by 
the MPS only days before the law’s entry into force, primarily features ministries 
and government agencies, although it has since been pragmatically expanded to 
include some social organisations with government backing too. However the lack 
of incentives as well as the associated risks for would-be sponsors turned this dual 
registration requirement into the main obstacle to registration faced, particularly 
by smaller NGOs with only limited administrative resources.
Further restrictive measures in the FNGO Law (Pissler 2016) – such as the pro-
hibition to engage in or fund “political activities” of any kind (Art. 5), or the possibil-
ity of detaining FNGO staff for supporting advocacy work (worded as “inciting resist-
ance to laws and regulations” or “spreading rumours,” Art. 47) – are best understood 
as an explicit legalisation of previously informal (but nonetheless real) state powers 
to control and potentially intimidate foreign and Chinese NGO staff alike.
Making Sense of China’s “Soft” Communication on a “Hard” Law
Despite the FNGO Law’s origins in state security circles, official policy communica-
tion in the party-state media has broadly refrained from the public scapegoating 
strategy very common in other countries that have similarly passed restrictive laws 
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on foreign civil society – such as Russia, Venezuela, and Hungary. Instead, the of-
ficial line has been to emphasise the generally positive contribution of INGOs to 
China’s development. In support of this soft framing, the law promises rewards to 
FNGOs that make “outstanding contributions to the development of China’s public 
welfare sector” (Art. 8), while the entirety of chapter IV is dedicated to “facilitation 
measures” for “NGOs working in accordance with the law” (Art. 33) – including tax 
incentives and other preferential policies (Art. 36).
A second strategy to fend off international criticism has been to justify the 
FNGO Law on the grounds that it represents an effort to fight “offshore” and “fake” 
organisations that use the shell of a non-profit organisation to swindle Chinese 
 donors (Sidel 2016). This is a real problem in China, and one that has seriously 
eroded public trust in charities. As such, this approach has allowed the Chinese 
party-state to present the FNGO Law as part of a wider anti-fraud campaign, one 
aimed at increasing “trust” in the third sector by promoting better regulation and 
increasing transparency and accountability.
Ceremonial registration events for “successful” FNGOs and regular positive 
media reports suggest a friendly, service-oriented attitude towards foreign organ-
isations. PSBs, which had no previous experience in managing non-profits, have 
organised workshops for FNGO representatives throughout the country to address 
questions about the many uncertainties surrounding the interpretation and imple-
mentation of the new law. INGO communication also contributes to this positive 
image: while several INGO leaders have agreed to share their “registration stories” 
in public, these accounts mostly strike a positive undertone and therefore support 
the official Chinese narrative about “rule-of-law” and increased transparency.  Other 
INGOs that may have, or are experiencing, more trouble shy away from public state-
ments or even from making complaints, for obvious reasons.
Two Years On: FNGO Law Implementation and Registration  
Experiences
Obtaining a representative picture of INGO experiences with the new law remains 
difficult. While the official registration data provided by the MPS is arguably more 
comprehensive than any available information on foreign NGO activities in China 
prior to 2017, one obvious limitation is its bias towards successfully registered or-
ganisations. Actually, the 734 organisations that have established representative of-
fices or carry out temporary activities under the FNGO law to date likely represent 
less than 10 per cent of all foreign NGOs present in China before the legislation’s 
enactment. How many among the remaining 90 plus per cent have seized or sus-
pended their activities in China, continue to operate without registration, or are cur-
rently still trying to register remains unknown. While no official instances of the de-
nial of registration have been made public, many smaller NGOs simply fail to find a 
Chinese sponsor and to navigate the bureaucratic maze accompanying registration.
While private accounts by FNGO staff largely confirm the officially propagated 
positive and helpful attitude of PSB officials, they also suggest considerable differ-
ences and inconsistencies regarding the interpretation of several vaguely worded 
clauses. For instance, Art. 21 prevents FNGOs from “fundraising within mainland 
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China” and thereby supports the idea that foreign actors are destined to be phased 
out gradually – with the hope that domestic charities will take over as the main 
funders of philanthropic activities. But FNGO experiences suggest vast imple-
mentation differences at the regional and local levels, depending on the particular 
supervisory authority and NGO at hand. While some tax offices accept (formally) 
unsolicited donations by FNGOs within mainland China, others prohibit their ac-
ceptance – be it out of ignorance of the law’s details, or of a wish to keep on the safe 
side in light of the central leadership’s unabated anti-corruption efforts.
The inconsistent implementation practice reflects the uncertainty among Chi-
na’s bureaucrats responsible for implementing such a law without adequate prepa-
ration. At the same time, it testifies to bureaucratic wrangles between parts of the 
administration keen on restraining the influence of foreign actors on China’s society 
on the one hand, and those eager to continue established working relationships at 
local level on the other. The latter camp includes those who are eager to learn from 
international experiences while promoting the “globalisation” of China’s own social 
organisations – a policy known as “welcoming in so that China can step out” (Jia 
2016). Overall, the enactment of China’s first law on foreign NGOs has not changed 
the fact that any civil society activity basically remains subject to political goodwill 
of involved actors rather than depending on formal-legal details.
Gradually Replacing Foreign with Domestic NGOs, and Smaller 
with Larger Ones
The shifting role of INGOs in the eyes of Chinese authorities also needs to be placed 
in the context of the latter’s parallel effort to promote the “healthy development” of 
domestic charities, thereby making up for a decline in foreign aid to China’s social 
service sector. Thus China’s Charity Law, which was passed only one month ahead 
of the FNGO Law in 2016, was mostly positively received within China’s third sec-
tor and academic community, as it has the potential to give Chinese foundations an 
additional legal basis to operate and engage in public fundraising. This further sub-
stantiates the Chinese government’s “import substitution” plans for the third sector.
The “smooth” replacement of foreign with domestic third sector funding, how-
ever, is currently being hindered in two ways: For one thing, most Chinese founda-
tions still lack the capacity and experience to build donor–grantee relationships with 
smaller NGOs. They often favour running their own projects, with a strong prefer-
ence for highly visible, one-off activities over long-term ones with a sustainable so-
cial impact (Shieh 2017). Second, even for organisations working in ”non-sensitive”, 
politically condoned fields such as poverty alleviation, education, or healthcare, the 
regulatory environment is proving much less enabling than initially hoped for. New 
“Draft Regulations on Social Organisation Management” issued by the MoCA in 
August 2018 fell short of many people’s expectations, and even threaten to further 
raise registration thresholds for foundations – although they do also promise to lift 
the onerous dual registration requirement for certain politically supported activi-
ties (e.g. natural science exchanges, social service delivery). Consequently, despite 
the strict legal differentiation between overseas and domestic civil society organisa-
tions, the government’s tendency to favour larger foundations – whose operations 
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can be more easily supervised – over smaller NGOs and less formalised grassroots 
citizen initiatives applies to Chinese and international actors alike.
The law’s wording also suggests that the Chinese term for “NGO” (fei zhengfu 
zuzhi) now exclusively refers to foreign organisations from “developed” countries. 
For one thing, with the whole “civil society” concept having turned into a taboo 
subject from 2013, domestically Chinese organisations are no longer referred to as 
“non-governmental” – but, instead, as “social organisations” (shehui zuzhi). Sec-
ond, virtually all foreign organisations now registered under the FNGO Law (apart 
from industry associations) come from “Western” countries (plus Japan and South 
Korea). This Western bias is most obvious when focusing on the 110 unique Euro-
pean organisations with registered activities under the FNGO Law (cf. Figure 1).
This absence of non-Western European organisations may appear surprising in 
light of China’s intense diplomatic efforts to promote relations including “people-
to-people ties” with Central and Eastern European countries under the 16+1 format. 
From a Chinese foreign policy viewpoint, however, it makes sense as these coun-
tries are categorised as falling under the umbrella of its “Belt and Road Initiative” 
(BRI), and thus as partners in (non-competitive) “South–South relations.” As such, 
China’s relations with these countries are governed by a different logic than those 
with Western liberal democracies.
European NGOs’ Coping Strategies, Trade-Offs and Opportunities
From a European policy perspective, the new legal and political environment for 
non-profit work in China presents a number of challenges. Following a brief review 
of current coping strategies and potentially emerging opportunities for European 
civil society actors, this section will then present some strategic reflections for fur-
ther societal engagement both with and in China.
First, it should be noted that for many the FNGO Law has not turned out to 
be as much of a watershed in their China-related activities as initially expected. In 
fact, many FNGOs report continuity before and after 2017, since the FNGO Law’s 
oppressive potential has been scarcely manifested. Generally, non-profits already 
Figure 1 
Number of Unique 
European Organisa-
tions Pursuing FNGO 
Law Activities
Source: Authors’ own 
compilation, based on 
MPS data/The ChinaFile 
NGO Project (as of  
6 November 2018).
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registered with the MoCA under previous regulations and those with a long tradi-
tion of carrying out social programmes with tangible benefits for local authorities 
have found it easier to accommodate the new framework. In turn, the political en-
vironment for activities in “sensitive” fields and advocacy work more generally had 
already been in decline for almost a decade – forcing many foreign non-profits to 
end or reorient their China programmes. For those organisations directly affected 
by the law – mostly because they had previously operated in politically tolerated 
grey areas without formal registration or being registered as companies – three 
strategies can be observed to date:
Redirecting Activities to Politically Welcome Fields
The first and most common strategy among larger INGOs and foundations has been 
to focus or redirect their China-related activities towards fields that are explicitly 
given “legal protection” under the FNGO Law, thereby supporting official Chinese 
policy goals for socio-economic development. In a comparison of MPS registra-
tion statistics with publicly available data on Foreign NGO activities prior to 2017, 
Batke and Hang (2018) found supporting evidence for the growing alignment of 
registered FNGOs with government priorities for social work – namely, regarding 
disaster relief, education, health, and youth. European NGOs follow a similar trend, 
albeit with a stronger-than-average focus on “Technology” and “Law and Govern-
ance” (cf. Figure 2). 
Environmental protection also continues to be popular, as it is one of the few fields 
in which somewhat autonomous Chinese non-profits are still able to develop and 
perform meaningful work. While civil society work is not officially endorsed in this 
area, most projects can be said to contribute to the central government’s ambitious 
objectives in terms of fighting environmental degradation, air and soil pollution, as 
well as climate change. Together with youth exchanges, it is also an area in which the 
European Union and China share a clear political interest in deepening co oper ation.
Figure 2 
(Re)directing or 
Reframing Activities 
towards Less Sensi-
tive Policy Fields
Source: Authors’ own 
compilation, based on 
MPS data/The ChinaFile 
NGO Project (as of 6 
November 2018).
Note: Most popular 
“fields of activity” by 
number of FNGOs with 
registered office.
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In addition to officially declared fields of activity, more and more INGOs are 
starting to present their activities as contributing to Xi’s touted BRI – in an effort 
to ease bureaucratic approval and boost Chinese buy-in. In this sense, they comple-
ment the growing efforts of Chinese “NGOs” (many of them with a strong government 
background) to “sing the China story” internationally, and thereby insert key terms of 
official CCP ideology – such as “Belt and Road”, “win-win cooperation”, or the “Com-
munity of Shared Future for Mankind” – into the lexicon of United Nations fora.
Continuing to Operate Without Formal Registration
Carrying out third sector activities without FNGO Law registration appears to be 
an option for two diametrically opposed reasons. On the one side, government-
organised NGOs (“GONGOs”) from non-Western countries often engage in activi-
ties that the Chinese government classifies as “strengthening people-to-people ties” 
along the BRI. The scarcity of FNGO offices or even temporary activity registration 
from BRI countries suggests that these activities – including student exchanges, 
non-governmental delegation visits, or scholarship programmes – are not expected 
to be brought under the securitised framework of the FNGO Law. More akin to 
“Track-Two Diplomacy” than to transnational civil society, these exchanges repre-
sent a new model for promoting the societal component of Chinese foreign policy in 
the earlier-mentioned South–South relations.
On the other side of the spectrum, meanwhile, many smaller NGOs without 
governmental support have been either unable or unwilling to comply with the now 
mandatory legal framework. They thus continue to operate in the something of a 
grey area that has characterised much of foreign civil society work in China for 
decades now. While this may be the only viable strategy for organisations engaged 
in sensitive fields (defined and prohibited under the FNGO Law as “political activi-
ties”), it also bears incalculable risks for employees and Chinese partners alike.
Suspending Activities in Mainland China
Almost two years into the FNGO Law era, only 340 organisations have successfully 
established a permanent representative office so far. The question of how many 
non-profit organisations have internally decided to leave China and how many are 
still trying to register or return to the country after a temporary suspension remains 
a difficult one to answer. While several advocacy groups are already working from 
Hong Kong or Taipei, European NGOs with previous activities on the mainland 
have generally been prudent with public statements about their China strategies. A 
wait-and-see approach with a silent suspension of China-related activities is most 
feasible for multilaterally oriented INGOs without permanent staff and with clear 
alternatives in neighbouring countries, while the choice is much harder for those 
with a long-term China commitment and established trust relationships on the 
ground. Nearing the FNGO Law’s third year of implementation, the question will 
be  whether Chinese authorities continue to tolerate non-registered organisations 
or start to truly force out those that have not managed to find a willing sponsor or 
partner organisation. 
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Chinese Norm-Shaping Ambitions
While many foreign NGOs do formally continue to operate in China within the new 
legal environment, the overall political climate has become much more difficult 
to navigate for both Chinese and foreign civil society actors. This contradicts the 
official “rule-of-law” narrative initially used to justify the FNGO Law’s promulga-
tion. Despite inconsistent implementation, the FNGO Law so far appears to achieve 
an important government objective: crowding out potentially disruptive advocacy 
organisations while directing other FNGOs towards government-supported policy 
fields.
 Another purported objective, of increasing the transparency of foreign NGO 
work in China, appears to have partially materialised for the (still relatively few) 
registered organisations. The gradual replacement of foreign with Chinese philan-
thropic funding for China’s social sector is still impeded by structural deficiencies, 
legal obstacles, and a lack of public trust in the domestic charity sector. These cir-
cumstances conspire to leave many smaller Chinese NGOs in the lurch.
Finally, Chinese perspectives on the third sector are also rapidly expanding 
from a purely domestic focus towards taking into consideration the impact of inter-
national civil society on China’s image and policy interests. As Chinese non-profits 
are now required to “go out” and carry “China’s good voice” into the world through 
charity and international cooperation (Liu 2016), the Chinese leadership cannot 
simply build legal walls to shut out all foreign civil society influences. More gener-
ally, China heavily relies on international cooperation to strengthen its own norm-
projection capacities in the long run. Notably, public opinion in BRI target coun-
tries has emerged as a prominent concern of Chinese intellectuals and policymakers 
since Xi Jinping advanced the concept of minxin xiangtong (literally “letting the 
peoples’ hearts communicate,” officially translated as “strengthening people-to-
people ties”) in his keynote address at the Belt and Road Forum in May 2017. The 
Chinese leadership’s ambition to build a social basis for the BRI and thereby use 
social organisations to improve public opinion in target countries adds another di-
mension to China’s policy towards non-profit organisations. Within this new frame-
work, INGOs can be useful as partners and facilitators for Chinese organisations in 
their endeavouring to “go out” and contribute to the “smooth construction of the 
Belt and Road” – provided that they neatly conform with Chinese government pol-
icies and related slogans. 
At the same time, these international ambitions – which are prominently voiced 
in foreign policy circles – also reveal the internal contradictions in China’s civil so-
ciety policies. Eventually, the “people-to-people” rhetoric needs at least some cred-
ible basis in the form of non-governmental exchanges. This is a requirement that 
appears difficult to reconcile with the leadership’s current approach to regulating 
the non-profit sector, which currently remains heavily focused on micro-manage-
ment and top-down control.
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Difficult Trade-Offs and Remaining Opportunities for 
European NGOs
The institutional environment for both foreign and domestic civic actors in China 
has changed significantly over the past decade, and most thoroughly over the past 
two years. This has accentuated a long-existing dilemma for international non-prof-
its, which face an increasingly difficult trade-off between playing by China’s rules 
and opting out altogether. To officially continue operations in China means comply-
ing with the new institutional rules, accepting tightened supervision by Chinese 
sponsors and security personnel, renegotiating one’s own agenda to fit the official 
line, and maybe sacrificing certain values and principles in exchange for access – as 
well as for the pragmatic benefit of not burning bridges. On the other hand, exit-
ing mainland China to avoid the costs of compliance, or the risk of compromising 
one’s own agenda and credibility among international supporters, also means los-
ing touch with developments on the ground, severing ties with China’s still vibrant 
society, and potentially putting an end to projects valuable to many people.
The assessment of this trade-off will, of course, yield different outcomes de-
pending on the issue area at hand. In sectors such as poverty alleviation, social 
security, or healthcare services, but also environmentalism and climate change 
mitigation, chances are good that meaningful activities will remain possible. If in-
ternational non-profits are ready to comply with the formal rules of registration and 
reporting, they should not face too onerous burdens or pressures to compromise on 
their agendas. In other issue areas such as human and labour rights, religious and 
ethnic issues, or legal assistance to vulnerable social groups – which are perceived 
by the Chinese party-state as potential challenges to regime legitimacy – a thorough 
cost–benefit analysis might suggest that it is wiser to opt out entirely. For some 
Western civil society actors, the forced end to their activities in China could liberate 
them from self-imposed restraints, and thus strengthen critical voices and advocacy 
work in Western countries themselves.
With these differentiations in mind, European NGOs should be clear about po-
tential hazards in their work and do sober longer-term analyses of the costs and 
bene fits involved in continued activity within China’s new institutional environment. 
From a policy perspective, European decision makers urgently need to strengthen 
their commitment to meaningful civil society exchanges and work against the further 
“GONGOisation” of the people-to-people pillar of EU–China relations. This would 
be possible, for example, by protecting the diversity of civil society participants from 
both Europe and China (Fulda in press). Meanwhile, the internationalisation and 
growing global impact of China’s own (albeit often state-backed) social organisations 
also opens up new areas for potential cooperation and engagement on global govern-
ance issues, or for the promotion of the UN Sustainable Development Goals – which 
also figure prominently in contemporary Chinese philanthropy debates.
In times of serious challenges to the liberal international order, Europe’s 
strength continues to lie in the diversity of actors and plurality of voices involved 
in its foreign policy and international relations. Upholding this diversity requires 
both European non-profits that strive for continued civil society engagement and 
cooperation with China and also NGOs that dare to speak up and inform the Eu-
ropean public about critical aspects of China’s “alternative” model – and growing 
global impact.
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